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MENTAL STATES IN WILLS*
A. J. WHITE HUTTON**

Section I of the Wills Act of 19171 provides as follows:
"Every person of sound mind and of the age of twenty-one years or upwards, whether married or single, may dispose by will of his or her real estate,
whether such estate is held in fee simple or for the life or lives of any other
person or persons, and whether in severalty, joint tenancy or common, and also
of his or her personal estate."
SOUND MIND

The Act prescribes that the person making the will must have "a sound
mind." What is meant-by this requirement? In every day language and according to standard dictionaries, the meaning is a mind that is healthy, not diseased,
with faculties complete and in perfect action. But this is not the meaning attached
to this phrase by the judges who, under our system of law and government, are
the final arbiters of the meaning of the legislative body.2 In the redundant and
flourishing style of the scrivener of the past century, the testator asseverated that
he was "of sound disposing mind and memory." Not that this was a necessary
declaration, for, as Drew, J., explains in Olshefski's Estate,3 citing a wealth of
authority, 4 where the will is properly executed, "a presumption of testamentary
*Being part of the revised edition of Hutton on Wills, to be published by Soney and Sage.
All rights reserved by A. J. White Hutton and Soney ancd Sage.
* *A.B., Gettysburg College, 1897; A.M., Gettysburg College, 1899; LL.B., Harvard University, 1902; Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law, 1902-; Member of Pennsylvania House of

Representatives, 1931-1935; Author of Hutton on WILLS IN PENNSYLVANIA.
120 PS 181.
Brennan's Est., 312 Pa. 335 (1933) 168 A. 25; Pusey's Est.,
321 Pa. 248 (1936) 184 A. 844;
Cookson's Est., 325 Pa. 81 (1937) 188 A. 904; Weber's Est., 334 Pa. 216 (19.19) 5 A. 2d. 550.
3337 Pa. 420 (1940) ii A. 2d. 487.
4Grubbs vs. McDonald, 91 Pa. 236 (1879); Wertheimer's Est.,286 Pa. 155 (1926) 133 A.
144; Lawrence's Est.,
286 Pa. 58 (1926) 132 A. 786; Null's Est.,302 Pa. 64 (1930) 153 A. 137.
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capacity and lack of undue influence arises, and the contestants must adduce compelling evidence to upset the will, since the law favors its validity." Nevertheless, the ancient phrase is a happy one, for it affords us a clue to the meaning of
the statute, according to the cases. The mind must be disposing and there must
be memory, both of which indicate soundness. If this be true, nothing else matters. According to Kephart, J., in Lawrence's Estate,5 "Old age, sickness, distress,
debility of body, peculiar beliefs and opinions, incapacity to do business, partial
failure of memory, neither prove nor raise a presumption of incapacity."
In Leech vs. Leech,6 Judge King explains the matter as accurately and tersely
as may be found in any judicial utterance:
"A disposing mind and memory, in the view of the. law, is one in
which the testator is shown to have had at the making and execution
of a last will a full intelligent consciousness of the nature and effect of
the act he was engaged in; a full knowledge of the property he possessed; an understanding of the disposition he wished to make of it by
will, and of the persons and objects he desired to participate in his

bounty."

Upon these succinct specifications hang all the Pennsylvania law as to
testamentary capacity, amply supported by a wealth of excellent illustrative
7
cases.
DISPOSING MIND AND MEMORY

Recurring to the test of Judge King as to testamentary capacity, it is required
that the person making a will shall have the consciousness and realization of
the act that he is performing, viz, in a word he must have mentality sufficient
to know that he is making a will and that the effect of the instrument as executed
will be to give title at his death to the property designated and to the persons
designated; this is the ultimate meaning of sound disposing mind and memory.
In Daniel vs. Daniel8 the scrivener called upon to testify stated that he went
to the bedside of the testator who was in a dying condition and he asked him
what he wanted done, to which the answer of the testator was in Pennsylvania
German: "Der Charles wess"--Charles knows. Charles was a brother substantially interested in the terms of the will. Later Charles said to the testator: "Now
here is the man whom I have brought to write your will." Charles then told the
testator to state to the scrivener what he wanted and followed by asking the
testator how much certain persons were to receive, mentioning $2000, $3000,
$4000, $5000, and $6000. The testator in these interrogations would always
select the last sum mentioned. Another witness, a lawyer who had transacted
6286 Pa. 58 (1926)

132 A. 786.
61 Phila. 244, affirmed, 21 Pa. 67 (1853).
7
Duncan's Will, 147 Pa. Sup. Ct. 133 (1941)
839 Pa. 191 (1861).

23 A. 2d. 357, and cases following in these notes.
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business for the testator, testified that in his opinion the testator was of a low
grade of intelligence, about the same as an imbecile. Woodward, J., reviewing
this and other testimony, agreed that the judgment on the verdict of the jury
against the will should be affirmed. However, the learned justice pointed out
that when a man is spoken of as understanding the will he is making, it is never
meant that he comprehends the possible legal tffect which lawyers and judges
may impute to the words he employs. The nicest and most difficult questions in
law frequently arise upon the construction of wills. Testamentary capacity does
not necessarily include an ability to grapple such questions. This is apparent
in Diehl's Estate' where, in a homemade will the testatrix used the expression,
"I have given (not bequeathed) $600 or more, if necessary, to put a good iron
fence around the graveyard near the Lutheran Church in this place." In all
probability, testatrix was not informed as to the technical meaning of the words
that she used, but it was quite clear that she meant to make a gift to take effed
at death and she knew what the act of making a will signified or, in the language
of the test, she had a consciousness and realization of the import of her act.
However, it is important to bear in mind that the law of Pennsylvania does not
require a high order of intelligence in the making of a will and it has been stated
repeatedly by our courts that it requires less capacity to make a will than to do
ordinary business, although in Maryland by statute testamentary capacity is placed
on a par with contractual capacity. 10
In Wilson vs. Mitchell11 the testator was 100 years of age at the time of the
execution of his will. Much testimony was brought out concerning his physical
debility, loss of memory, the habit of dosing off into sleep frequently on occasions during the daytime, and filthiness of habits and care of his person. However, the direct evidence was on the matter of the execution of his will that he
maintained a very lively interest in the same and directed what should be done
and discussed various details, thus indicating that he realized the import and
significance of his act. Said Trunkey, J.:
"If from any cause he is so enfeebled in mind as to be incapable of
knowing
property
of appreciating the effect of any
dispositionthe
made
by himhe
of possesses;
it;and of understanding to whom he intends
to
he 67.
is without
the have
requisite
testamentary capacity: Leech
vs. bequeath
Leech, 21it,Id.
'He must
memory.
A man in whom this
faculty
is totally
extinguished
be said to
understanding
to any degree
whatever,
or forcannot
any purpose.
Butpossess
his memory
may be
may
be able itat may
alltimes
to recollect
the by
names,
very not
imperfect;
the by,
persons
be. greatly
impaired
age or
disease.or the
He
families of those with whom he had been intimately acqainted; may
at times ask idle questions, and repeat those which had before een
asked and answered; and yet his understanding may be sufficiently
9

1 Pa. Superior
L
Ct. 293 (1899).
0Ann. Cases, 1915 A. 362-3; Davis v. Calvert, 5 Gill & J. 209 (1833) 25 Am
11101 Pa. 495 (1882).

e. e282.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

sound for many of the ordinary transactions of life. He may not have
sufficient strength of memory, and vigor of intellect, to make, and to
digest all the parts of a contract, andyy be competent to direct the
distribution of his property by will. This is a subject which he may
possibly have often thought of; aiid there is probably no person who
has not arranged such a disposition in his mind before he committed
it to writing; more especially, in such a reduced state of mind and
memory, he may be able to recollect and to understand the disposition
of his property which he had made by a former will, when the same
is distinctly read over to him. The question is not so much what was
the degree of memory possessed by the testator as this-Had he a disposing memory? Was he capable of recollecting the property he was
about to bequeath; the manner of distributing it and the objects of his
bounty? To sum up the whole in the most simple and intelligent
form-Were his mind and memory sufficiently sound to enable him
to know, and to understand, the business in which he was engaged
at the time when he executed the will?' Stevens vs. Vandeve, 4 Wash.
C. C. 262; Lowe vs. Williamson, I Green Ch. 82. Neither age, nor
sickness, nor extreme distress or debility of body will affect the capacity
to make a will, if sufficient intelligence remains. The failure of memory is not sufficient to create the incapacity, unless it be total, or extend
to his immediate family or property."
In Minnig's Estate 12 testatrix was 80 years of age at the time of the execution of her will dated March 3, 1927. She died July 29, 1927, leaving her entire
estate to her brother, John Minnig. On January 19, 1927 testatrix suffered a
hemorrhage of the brain and was unconscious for five days, during which time
and until March 4, 1927 she was attended by her family physician who did not
call after that because she had recovered to such an extent that the doctor did
not think it necessary. Before her lawyer drew the will he consulted the physician
to learn whether she was mentally competent to dispose of her property, and on
being told she was, he called at her home on March 3, 1927 and conversed with
her concerning the disposition she wished to make of her estate. The will was
then written out in longhand in her presence, read to her, and she signed it by
her mark and it was witnessed by two persons, a man and wife who had been
employed by the testatrix to attend her and look after her affairs during her illness. The will was probated and thereafter an appeal was taken by certain nieces
and nephews of the decedent who in a petition to the court prayed for the
awarding of an issue on the questions of mental incompetency.and undue influence. An answer was filed denying the averments of the petition and after
hearing testimony the court dismissed the appeal and refused an issue on the
ground that the evidence of undue influence and mental incompetency was insufficient to justify a submission of the questions to a jury or to sustain a verdict
against the will. In reviewing the record and affirming the decree of the court
below, Frazer, J., observed:
12300

Pa. 435 (1930) 150 A. 626.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

"So far as what took place at the time of the signing of the will
is concerned, there is no contradiction, since contestants called no witness who was present at that particular time. The evidence relied on
by the contestants was to the effect that, after the spell of sickness
which began on January 19, 1927, testatrix was in a weakened physical
condition and scarcely able to help herself and would ask 'all kinds of
p-cliar question'; had a poor memory in regard to her business afairs, and would even at times fail to recollect her friends and relatives;
would repeatedly ask the same questions, stating to a witness that she
believed she was losing her mind, although the witness referred -to a
time a year or more before the death of testatrix; the same witness
also testified that testatrix said she had made her will and that her
brother John Minnig would not get a cent; as a matter of fact, the
will which had been in existence before the one now in question gave all
her property to nieces and nephews to the exclusion of her brother,
and the statement was accordingly correct at the time it was made.
Taking this evidence as a whole there is a total lack of testimony to
overcome that of the attorney and witnesses to the will and the attending physician to the effect that at the time the will was executed
testatrix was mentally competent to dispose of her property."
In Cookson's Estate Is an interesting situation was presented which well
illustrates the attitude of our higher courts in maintaining the right of testamentary
disposition in a case of old age and physical as well as mental debility. The
testatrix was 82 years of age, and at the time of the execution by mark of a
codicil to her will was extremely ill in a hospital and died four days thereafter.
This was drafted by her business agent and in accordance with her wishes as he
afterwards testified. He was also present at the time of the execution. The attending physician, together with another person, were the subscribing witnesses.
Following the death the will was probated and later an issue was awarded by the
orphans' court to determine decedent's testamentary capacity at the time the codicil
was executed and whether it was procured by undue influence. The jury found
testamentary incapacity and undue influence. Upon appeal Kephart, C. J., reviewing a large number of the leading cases, the judgment of the court below was
reversed and a new trial ordered. Although the subscribing witnesses by their
affidavits before the register of wills stated that the testatrix had testamentary
capacity to the best of their knowledge, nevertheless at the trial the doctor testified
that the decedent at the time of the execution of the codicil was in a dazed condition and did not appear to comprehend what sht was doing. The other witness
testified that the decedent was in a semi-comatose condition at the time and had
to be aroused. Both testified that the decedent fell back exhausted before completing the execution. On the other hand the business agent, together with the
daughter of the decedent who was a beneficiary under the will, testified very
strongly in favor of the testamentary capacity of decedent and that at the time
of execution she was rational, wide awake and fully understood what she was
1s325 Pa. 81 (1937)

188 A. 904.
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doing. The Chief Justice in referring to the burden which rested upon contestant,
explained as follows:
"The burden rested upon the contestant, Brown, to prove both undue influence and lack of testam'entary capacity. The invalidity of a
will for these reasons must be established by the manifest weight of
evidence, and the testimony as a whole must support the verdict. In
such an issue the judge acts as a chancellor and should not permit the
finding of a jury to stand which is contrary to the weight of the evidence. While testatrix was extremely sick when the codicil was written,
no confidential relationship was shown to exist between her and appellant. The fact that proponent is a daughter does not of itself constitute such confidential relation as would shift the burden of proof.
These principles are too well settled to require further elaboration."
Stating furthermore that the record in the present case was void of any
evidence sufficient to justify a finding of undue influence, the reversal and' the
awarding of a new trial were based on the following reasoning:
"The trial court charged with respect to the attending physician's
testimony: 'You should consider the testimony of Dr. Daniel J. Donnelly, the physician in attendance on Mrs. Cookson, bearing in mind
that a physician who has been in attendance upon a patient for a considerable length of time is ordinarily best qualified to pass upon the
mental capacity of a testator.' This instruction unduly emphasized
the importance of Dr. Donnellys testimony as contrasted to that of
Mr. Foster, the scrivener and business agent of decedent for many
years. This court has stated on many occasions that exp'ert medical
opinions are of little weight when based upon insufficient facts or an
erroneous conception of testamentary capacity, and should be entirely
disregarded when contrary to established facts revealing mental capacity.
Furthermore, such opinions are of very doubtful value where they are
purely theoretical in character, and the physician is ignorant of the
actual facts upholding or negativing the existence of testamentary
capacity. In the instant case Dr. Donnelly's testimony is far less convincing than that of Mr. Foster, assuming both told the truth. Mr.
Foster had been decedent's agent for a long period of time and was
fully conversant with her ability to supervise her business affairs. If
she was as mentally alert as he testified and actually conversed with
him in the manner related by him, it is evident that she possessed
testamentary capacity. She not only explained to him her reason for
changn the will, but arranged to have her hospital'bills paid, and
inquired-as to an interest payment on her property. On the other hand,
Dr. Donn'elly saw her for the first time on December 5, 1933. His
opinion was based solely on his general observation plus the fact that
his physical examination showed him she was extremely toxic. He
admitted he made no examination to determine her mental capacity.
The essence of his testimony is that the degree of toxicity from which
she was suffering would render her mentally incompetent to understand the meaning of her act and to whom her property would go. He
did not relate any actual facts definitely establishing this conclusion
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or evidencing in reality such mental weakness on her part. He did not
see her for more than three hours before the codicil was executed
and admitted he did not know definitely her mental condition at that
time, but stated that in her condition her mind could not have been
clear. It is obvious that his opinion, based almost solely on her physical
condition, could have little weight in face of the facts testified to by
Mr. Foster, if the jury found him to be worthy of belief. The court's
charge unequivocally placed Dr. Donnelly's testimony on a much higher
plane than that of Mr. Foster, if not as conclusive of the question, and
warranted the jury in finding testamentary incapacity on the basis of
his medical opinion, even though they might believe the scrivener.
This was prejudicial error and in itself requires a new trial."1 4
Aggas vs. Munnell' 5 is likewise an apt illustration where there was concerned
the will of a Civil War veteran executed several months before the death of the
testator at the age of 87. He sent for a lawyer and there was considerable discussion concerning a will, and eventually the lawyer drew it up and sent the san'e
to the testator for execution. The testator discovered, however, that the lawyer
had omitted one of his grandchildren and the will was consequently returned for
revision. This was accomplished by the lawyer and the will as corrected was
returned to the testator who then had witnesses called, and after the will was
read he asked his daughter for a pen and also the date which he inserted, signed
the will and had it properly witnessed. By its terms the daughter with whom
the testator made his home was given 76 percent of the estate, and the rest was
distributed among the testator's grandchildren. A caveat was filed against the
probate of the will, the matter was certified to the orphans' court and by it to tI*
court of common pleas for jury trial. The questions of undue influence and
testamentary capacity were 'embraced in the issue and both questions were submitted to the jury which found a general verdict for the defendants or contestants,
and from the judgment entered thereon the plaintiff daughter appealed to the
Supreme Court. In reversing the judgment and entering a judgment 'for the
plaintiff, Walling, J., stated that there was nothing in the record to sustain the
contention of undue influence and as to the mental capacity of the testator, the
following observations, inter alia, were made:
14 The following series of cases show the development of the judicial functions in will cases,
the granting of issues and the role played as chancellor in jury trials not as of common law.
Fleming's Est., 265 Pa. 399 (1919) 109 A. 265; Fleming's Est., 280 Pa. 252 (1924) 124 A. 419;
Tetlow's Est., 269 Pa. 486 (1921) 112 A. 758, wherein Moschzisker, C. J., prescribes rules, cf.
with Cross's Est., 278 Pa. 170 (1923) 122 Pa. 267, where the same writer lays down rules for
issues; Taylor's Est., 316 Pa. 557 (1934) 175 A. 540, per Drew, J.; Kline's Est., 322 Pa. 374
(1936) 186 A. 364, per Kephart, C. J.; DeLaurentii's Est., 323 Pa. 70 (1936) 186 A. 359, per
Stern, J., explaining the judicial function; Geist's Est., 325 Pa. 401 (1937) 191 A. 29; Patti's Est.,
133 Pa. Super. Ct. 81 (1938) 1 A. 2d. 791; Plott's Est., 335 Pa. 81 (1939) 5 A. 2d. 901; Noble's
Est., 338 Pa. 490 (1940) 12 A. 2d. 422; Rosenthal's Est., 339 Pa. 488 (1940) 15 A. 2d. 370, per
Linn, J., reviewing the cases; Porter's Est., 341 Pa. 476 (1941) 1.9 A. 2d. 731; Mohler's Est., 343
Pa. 299 (1941) 22 A. 2d. 680; these last two cases per Maxey, J.; that the issues should not embody
mixed questions of law and fact, see Phillip's Estate, 299 Pa. 415 (1930) 149 A. 719; Tranor's
Est., 324 Pa. 263 (1936) 188 A. 292; Orlady's Est,, 336 Pa. 369, 9 A. 2d. 539.
15302 Pa. 78 (1930) 152 A. 840.
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"There was in the instant case no such proof of general insanity
as to cast upon proponent the burden of showing a lucid interval when
the will was executed. See Harden v. Hays, 9 Pa. 151; Titlow v. Titlow,
54 Pa. 216, 93 Am. Dec. 691; Hoopes' Est., 174 Pa. 373, 34 A. 603.
That he was sleepy and drowsy on some days and much brighter on
others, indicated nothing abnormal. This is not uncommon in very
old people. As stated by Mr. Justice Trunkey, speaking for the court,
in Wison v. Mitchell, 101 Pa. 495, 503: 'Dougal (the testator) had
lived over one hundred years before he made the will, and his physical
and mental weakness and defective memory were in striking contrast
with their strength in the meridian of his life. He was blind; not deaf,
but Mearing impaired; his mind acted slowly; he was forgetful of recent
events, especially of names, and repeated questions in conversation;
and sometimes, when aroused from sleep or slumber, would seem bewildered. It is not singular that some of those who had known him
when he was remarkable for vigor and intelligence, are of opinion
that his reason was so far gone that he was incapable of making a will,
although they never heard him utter an irrational expression.' The
will,' in the instant case, may not be just, but a person of disposing mind
may make an unjust will. Morgan's Estate, 219 Pa. 355, 68 A. 953;
Cauffman v. Long, 82 Pa. 72; GuaranteeT. & S. Dep. Co. v. Heidenreich,
supra.
In Lawrence's Estate' 6 and Wertheimer's Estate" are found two very interesting cases on testamentary capacity and decided by the Supreme Court not quite
a month apart and both excellent opinions by Kephart, J. In the former the facts
involved the will of an aged man which had been refused probate by the Register',
a caveat having been filed by his nieces and nephews. The orphans' court on
appeal refused to direct probate or to award an issue, and on appeal to the higher
court the decree was reversed and ordered that the will be admitted to probate.
In the latter case thk will of the testatrii was admitted to probate and on appeal
an issue was refused, which action by the orphans' court was sustained by the
higher court. In this case the charge of incapacity rested on chronic alcoholic
insanity from 1908 to the death of the testatrix in 1923. In both cases there was
medical testimony favoring testamentary incapacity, and in both cases the strongest
evidence as to capacity consisted of detailed statements of business as transacted
at about the time of the execution of the respective wills. In Wertheimer's Estate
is found this statement by the learned justice which appears to be characteristic
of so many of the will cases. In referring to the evidence concerning the eccentricities in drinking alcoholic liquors as indulged in by the testatrix, it was said:
"While all this is true, we cannot overlook our duty to safeguard
the integrity of wills, a policy for which this court is noted. We must
judge of the mental capacity as it is revealed by the evidence and ascertain whether it was so reduced through indulgences, general or
special, at the time the will was executed, as to cause the act to be
ineffective."
16 286'Pa. 58 (1926) 132 A. 786.
17286 Pa. 155 (1926) 133 A. 144.
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In Olshefski's Estate' 8 another case where the alleged testamentary incapacity
of the testatrix was due to alcoholism, the will was admitted to probate and upon
appeal an award was made of an issue and the jury found that the deceased lacked
testamentary capacity and was unduly influenced. Whereupon the proponent
appealed to the Supreme Court and the judgment was reversed with directions
to the court below to certify this result to the orphans' court. Lawrence's Estate19
and Wertheimer's Estate2° are cited with approval and again the medical testimony is discredited as will appear in the following excerpt from the opinion of
Drew, J., wherein after citing the above cases it is remarked:
"To rebut the presumption of sound and disposing memory, these
contestants and one doctor, a general practitioner, testified that deceased
had a weakened mind and was'addicted to excessive use of alcohol.
The doctor testified that he had first treated testatrix three months prior
to the execution of the will for a hemorrhage following an automobile
accident, in which she sustained a blow on the head. He stated that
her brain was atrophied, a condition which would become progressively
worse. He concluded that she must have been incapable of testamentary
disposition on the day of the execution of the will. This witness admittedly, however, had made no examination to determine her mental
capacity and was extremely vague as to when he had last treated her,
which at best was a considerable time prior to the execution of the will.
He based his conclusions on what he thought her physical condition
to be. He did not relate any actual facts to substantiate his conclusions
as to her mental condition. Accordingly, his opinion was not grounded
upon any definite or real knowledge of Mrs. Olshefski's testamentary
capacity at the time she executed her will. Such vague and inconsequential testimony is of very little value as evidence.
In support, on the other hand, of the action of the court in reversing, the
learned justice thus observed:
"As against the testimony of contestants, the proponent, introduced evidence by the two subscribing witnesses who were in no way
related to testatrix and who had no interest under the will. They testified that at the time of its execution testatrix was fully competent to
disp 9 se of her worldly possessions. One of these witnesses was the
scrivener, a justice of the peace, and he testified that testatrix made a
detailed recitation of everything she owned and the' disposition she
desired to be made of it, and that in doing so, she named each of her
children individually and determined just what each should receive.
The evidence as to the clarity of her mind was corroborated by the
testimony of the other subscribing witness. The overwhelming weight
of the testimony favors the competency of testatrix."
Pa. 420 (1940)
i See note 16, supra.
2-OSee note 17, supra.
18337
9

11 A. 2d. 487.
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KNOWLEDGE OF PROPERTY

Not only must the will maker have "a full and intelligent consciousness of
the nature and effect of the act" at the time of execution but in addition it is
stated he must have "a full knowledge of the property he possessed." However,
Woodward, J., in Daniel v. Daniel2l in laying down the test does not use the
adjective "full" in describing knowledge, although he does use this word in describing consciousness of the testator. He must have had a knowledge of the
property he possessed-an understanding of the disposition he wished to make
of it by the will, and of the persons and objects he desired to participate in his
bounty. But it is not necessary he should collect all them in one review. If he
understands in detail all he is about, and chooses with understanding and reason
between one disposition and another, it is sufficient. This is substantially followed
24
23
in Thompson v. Kyney22 and Wilson v. Mitchell. Likewise in Tetlow's Estate,
Moschzisker, C. J., citing Thompson v. Kyner26 and Kustus v. Hager26 and referring to the testator on this very matter points out that "if he appreciates, in
a general way, who his relations are and what property he possesses, and indicates an intelligent understanding of the disposition he desires to make of it, he
has testamentary capacity." These remarks are referred to with approval in
Olshefski's Estate, 27 citing Tetlow's Estate, 28 supra, and Phillips' Estate. 29 On
the other hand, the omission by a testator from his will of important parts of his
property might show a lack of memory indicating testamentary incapacity as
pointed out by Trunkey, J., in Wilson v. Mitchell.30
OBJECTS OF BOUNTY

The willmaker must have "an understanding of the disposition he wished
to make .

. .

. and of the persons and objects hL desired to participate in his

bounty." At another place the present writer in discussing testamentary power,
has observed that a property owner might dispose of his estate as he saw fit with
the exception of the restrictions mentioned. Furthermore that some writers inclined to the inclusion of the cases on soundness of mind in the same class
with restrictions on testamentary power. In reality the plenary power is so
restricted in this type of cases where courts and juries incline against a will of
a testator who has failed to recognize his moral obligations to those denominated
the natural objects of his bounty. If, for example, a father in his will should
ignore a dutiful child of whom he had been very fond, a plausible explanation
2139 Pa. 191 (1861).
2265 Pa. 468 (1871).
23101 Pa. 495 (1882).
24269 Pa. 486 (1921) 112 A. 758.
26
See note 22, supra.
26269 Pa. 103 (1920) 112 A. 45.
27
See note 18, supra.
2
See note 24, supra.
29299 Pa. 415 (1930) 149 A. 719.
90See note 23', supra.
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would be lack of memory, which as intimated by Trunkey, J., in Wilson v.
Mitchell,3 1 although not total yet extending to his immediate family, might indicate testamentary incapacity. In Stevenson v. Stevenson, 2 Woodward, J., alludes
to the old notion of a child being cut off with a shilling thus anticipating a future
effort to confess the will on ground of lack of memory and testamentary incapacity. In Crozer's Estate33 Kephart, J., observed that a man's widow and
children are the primary objects of his bounty. On the contrary, Woodward, J.,
in Stevenson v. Stevenson4 caustically observed:
"A man without parents, wife, or children, can scarcely be said
to have natural objects of his bounty; and when he has been permitted
to go through life attending to his own affairs, and taking good care
of his estate, it is too late, after he has made his will and died, for
collaterals to discover that for six or eight years his mind had been
under a cloud, and that it passed into total eclipse just at the moment
of their disappointment."
However, in Pattis' Estate38 Parker, J., of our Superior Court, in reversing
the decree of the lower court refusing an issue on testamentary capacity and undue
influence, referred to a sister and brothers of the decedent, living in Italy who
had been recipients of his generosity as possible objects of bounty. The inference,
was that the decedent would have considered them in any will which he subscribed
and again that his interest in these relations continuing explained, in part at least,
his declination to sign a will, as was testified, which left them nothing. It is
obvious that the point about natural objects of one's bounty is relative and may
or may not be pressed, according to the particular facts. This observation, fprthermore, should be remembered generally in will cases, for as Maxey, J., quoted
in a case on construction, "no will is brother to another." 86 On the question of
mental competency, in Griffin's Estate 37 it was said that the will, having excluded
relatives should be strictly scrutinized and clear proof required of "sound mind
and disposing memory" with the free exercise of voluntary choice.

INSANITY

Our cases, following the usual classification, distiriguish b'etween general
insanity which is mental incompetency complete-a permanent deficiency of mental
powers-and that which is partial-a specific and narrower form of insanitywherein there is deranged, erratic, distorted or delirious action evidenced by
31

See note 23, supra.
3233 Pa. 469 (1859).
33336 Pa. 266 (1939) 9 A. 2d. 535.

34

See not 32, supra.

85133 Pa. Super. Ct. 81 (1938)

1 A. 2d. 791.

86Joyce's Est., 273 Pa. 404 (1922) 117 A. 90; Knoll v. Hart, 308 Pa. 223 (1932)
37109 Pa. Super. Ct. 594 (1933) 157 A. 613.

162 A. 228.
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hallucination or delusion.38 In the words of Blackstone 9 an idiot is "one that
hath had no understanding from his nativity, and, therefore, is by law presumed
never likely to attain any"-an illustration of what is termed general insanity,
that is a permanent deficiency of mental powers. An imbecile, so called, and as
found in Daniel v. Daniel'0 is a type of this general insanity. Blackstone" also
defines a lunatic or one non compos mentis as "one who hath had understanding
but, by disease, grief, or other accident, hath lost the use of his reason. A lunatic
is indeed properly one that hath lucid intervals, some times enjoying his senses
and sometimes not, and that frequently depending upon the change of the
moon."4'
In modem psychiatry there are many terms to characterize the various types
of mental illness. As Lumpkin, J., observed in Slaughter v. Heath:48
"The mind grades up from zero to the intellectual boiling point
so gradually that dogmatic tests are of little value."
From a testamentary standpoint the test has already been discussed and it is
obvious that one who is generally insane, that is, without lucid intervals, cannot
possess testamentary capacity. Yet the will of such a person if presented for
probate with proofs of subscribing witnesses and with no caveat filed to warn
the register would probably, as a matter of routine, be admitted to probate. In
the cases, this has happened and upon appeal or issue granted, the insanity being
shown, the burden of proof in both senses 44 is imposed upon the proponent.
However, where there has been no adjudication or inquisition and contestants set
up insanity, the affirmative is upon them. In Grubbs v. McDonald 5 Gordon, J.,
declared:
"Testamentary capacity is the normal condition of one of full age,
and the affirmative is with him who undertakes to call it in question,
and this affirmative
he must establish, not in a doubtful, but in a positive,
6
manner."4
In Thompson v. Kyner,47 a case of senile dementia, mental weakness arising
from old age, the decay of the mental faculties following the loss of bodily vigor
and vitality-Thompson, J., said:
S8Taylor v. Trich, 165 Pa. 586 (1894) ; Reppy's Cases Law of Succession (1930)
Rood on Wills, 2d. Ed. (1926) 84.

227, note;

392
4 0 Bl. * 303.

See note 21, supra.

412 Bl. * 304.

422 BI. 271, Lewis' Ed. (1898) where editor characterizes statement of Blackstone as to the
influence of the moon or moonlight upon the human mind "as one of curious superstititions of the
time."
43127 Ga. 747 (1907) 27 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1, 57 S.E. 69.
441. As establishing the issue;
442. going forward with evidence to dislodge a prima facie case.
4591 Pa. 236 (1879).
46O1shefski's Est., 347 Pa. 420 (1940) 11 A. 2d. 487, per Drew, J., citing Grubbs v. McDonald and other cases, deducing from them the principle, "the contestants must adduce compelling evidence to upset the will, since the law favors its validity."
4765 Pa. 368 (1870).
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"Testamentary capacity is always presumed to exist until the contrary is established. An abnormal condition of mind is never presumed
when a testator makes his will, unless a previous aberration be shown,
of such a nature as may admit of a presumption of recurring unsoundness at any time."
ADJUDICATION

48

In Harden v. Hays an action in ejectment was brought by a devisee under
an alleged will dated September 24, 1844, which had never been proved before
the Register. At the trial plaintiff offered in evidence the will after proving the
handwriting of a deceased subscribing witness and by the oath of the surviving
subscribing witness to the signature of testator. The defendants then proved a
commission de lunatico inquirendo issued in December, 1844 with an inquest
returned finding John Hays, the testator, a lunatic for forty years past, with
lucid intervals. It was held that where there is uncontradicted evidence of general insanity at a particular period, the onus of showing a lucid interval at the
time of the subsequent execution of a will lies on the party claiming under it. It is
not sufficient that there is evidence of sanity before and after the day on which the
will was made and the jury cannot be permitted from such evidence to infer that
a lucid interval intervened, during- which the will was executed. In Tidow v.
Titlow49 before the execution of the will, testator was found by inquisition to be
a lunatic with lucid intervals. In an issue to determine the validity of the will, it
was laid down that a finding of lunacy with lucid intervals casts the burden of
showing sanity on those sustaining the will, but such finding is prima facie evidence only. In explaining these matters, Strong, J., said:
"The
remaining
assignments
of the
errorcourt
may tobecharge
considered
together.
Thetwo
plaintiffs
in error
requested
the jury
that David Titlow is bound conclusively by the finding of the inquisition, he having promoted it, submitted to it,
and accepted the office of
committee founded thereon, and also, that a lunatic has no power to
pass his estate inland immediately by conveyance or mediately by
will; and that after the lunacy has been established by inquisition a
lucid interval can avail nothing, unless the finding as to lunacy in general has been avoided by due course of law. These propositions the court
refused to affirm, and we think correctly. The general principle is,
that an inquisition of lunacy found is prima facie evidence in cases involving the sanity of the lunatic, and no more; such is the doctrine of
our cases.
However, in Harden v. Hays,50 supra, Rogers, J., stated that under such
circumstances, not only was the burden on the proponents to show that the will
was executed during a lucid interval but the evidence should be of the very time
of execution and of the most unexceptional kind and character.
489 Pa. 151 (1848).
4954 Pa. 216 (1867).

6osee note 48, supra.
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In Hoope's Estate61 caveats were filed, a will was presented for probate and
a request made that the register appoint "an orphans' court for the decision
thereof agreeably to the 25th section of the Act of Assembly approved March 15,
1832, relating to registers, and registers' courts." ' 2 The register certified the
record over and at a hearing before the orphans' court proponents presented a
prima facie case by proving the execution of the alleged will by the subscribing
witnesses, testamentary capacity being presumed until disproved in accordance
with Grubb v. MoDonald.5 3 The caveators then presented a record showing that
the testator had, on May 2, 1887, been found "a lunatic and has been so for the
space of six years last past and does not enjoy lucid intervals." The will was
dated June 28, 1892. The testimony showed the testator was over eighty years of
age at the time of signing the will; that his sister, several of his brothers and an
aunt were insane, and that he had been adjudged such; that his habits were filthy
and he was incapable of taking proper care of his person; that he did not know
who were his relatives or next of kin; that he had no clear conception of his
property or its value and was under the delusion that his farm contained a large
deposit of coal of great value; he was easily influenced, especially by anyone who
favored the restoration of his property to his control and that he believed his
committee, who was not his next of kin and against whom he at times exhibited
feelings of hostility, would secure a portion of his estate unless he made a will.
The Supreme Court in a per curiam affirmed the lower court in refusing to grant
an issue, dismissing the appeal with the terse comment: "We are convinced that
this-appeal is destitute of merit." In Brennan's Estate, 54 likewise, the lower court
refused to grant an issue, this time on appeal from the register admitting to probate the will of an aged maiden woman, who gave the residue of her estate to
the husband of her niece. A nephew being dissatisfied with the aunt's will challenged its validity on the grounds that it had been procured by undue influence
and testatrix lacked testamentary capacity. The decree of the lower court was
affirmed, Kephart, J., pointing out that although testatrix had two years before
the execution of the will been adjudged insane, nevertheless, insanity, with or
without adjudication, does not invalidate a will made during a lucid interval,
irrespective of when made. In this case the proponents had the burden of showing capacity at the time of making and executing the will and did so (1) by
evidence that testatrix had such capacity for a reasonable time before and after
the time of execution and (2) by evidence of capacity at the time of making the
will. The court explained even though the disposition of the property may have
been the result of the likes and dislikes of the testatrix, nevertheless, as Paxson, J.,
declared in Cauffman v. Long, 55 "A man's prejudices are a part of his liberty,"
51174 Pa. 373 (1896) 34 A. 603.
5zAct of March 15, 1832, P.L. 1831-32, 135; cf. Art. 5, Sec. 22, Pa. Const., adopted in 1873
and Sec.
17, Register of Wills Act, June 7, 1917, P.Lj 415, 20 PS 1841 et seq.
63
See note 45, supra.
$4312 Pa. 335 (1933) 168 A. 25.
582 Pa. 72 (1876).
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and concerning the evidence of condition before and after the execution of the
will, this was proper for a reasonable period both ways as indicative of the condition on the particular day, citing Aggar v. Munnellsd and Rubins v. Hamnett.5 7
The court discussed the evidence for and against the will and weighing the same
most carefully came to the conclusion that the judge %as correct in the result
reached.
In Brennan's Estate" s the appeal was from a decree refusing an issue, which
was affirmed, thus sustaining the will and in Duncan's Will 9 the appeal was from
a decree granting an issue wherein the jury found for the proponents, which was
affirmed thus likewise sustaining the will. The testator executed a holographic
will on August 19, 1938 while an inmate of the Harrisburg State Hospital for the
Insane. In 1908 he had been judicially declared a lunatic with lucid intervals
and the following year was committed to this institution where he remained until
April 29, 1939, when he was paroled. He went to the home of his sister where
he died less than a month later, May 21, 1939. The bulk of the estate amounting
to about $13,500.00 was left to the children of testator's former farmer. These
persons had not seen testator after 1909 but he carried on some correspondence
with them while in the hospital. The sole surviving sister in whose home he died
was not mentioned in the will. A caveat was filed by a nephew and the register
certified the record to the orphans' court, 60 and after hearing an issue was awarded
to try the question of testamentary capacity. Motions for judgment n.o.v. and a
new trial were overruled and an appeal was taken to the Superior Court. Baldridge, J., in affirming the judgment of the court below revievtd the leading cases
on testamentary capacity, the burden of proof in adjudicated insanity and the
nature of the evidence to rebut the presumption of insanity. It does not follow
necessarily that Pne confined as insane is incapable of making a will. In Draper's
Estate61l and in Sterrett's Estate62 it was observed that the will might have been
made during a lucid interval, even when the insanity entirely clouds the mind for
9
the time and the testator is confined in an asylum, citing Titlow v. Titlow.1
Furthermore, it was declared to be the policy of the courts to uphold the right
of testamentary disposition and protect the testator and "The legal objects of his
bounty," citing Central Trust Co., Exr. v. Boyer.4 Although the testator had
dementia praecox or schizophrenia of a paranoid type, his attending hospital
doctor testified that he had an intelligence quotient of 106, which was above
normal; that he had a good memory, ability for ordinary business matters, under56302 Pa. 78 (1930)

57294 Pa. 295 (1928)
5
SSee note 54, supra.

152 A. 840.

144 A. 72.

59147 Pa. Super. Ct. 133 (1941) 23 A. 2d. 357.
60SeC. 19, Reg. of Wills Act June 7, 1917, P.L. 415, 20 PS 1982. For explanation of procedure

as compared with former Registers Ct., see Cross's Est., 278 Pa. 170 (1923)
61215
62300
6
3See
64308

Pa. 314 (1906) 64 A. 520.
Pa. 116 (1930) 150 A. 159.
note 49, supra.
Pa. 402 (1932) 162 A. 806.

122 A. 267.
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standing of the value of money, had capacity of knowing the extent of his estate,
who his relatives were, and who the objects of his bounty should be; that he
understood thoroughly what he was doing when he wrote a will and knew the
effect of such. It was the witness' opinion that while his judgment was poor in
some instances, the testator had intellectual capacity to make a will. Against this
testimony, contestants presented that of a doctor, who testified as an expertbut who never knew the testator. In his judgment the testator had delusions and
while possessed of knowledge, his intelligence was affected by a diseased mind,
that "he knew what he was doing" but his "intelligence was missing" and therefore he did not have testamentary capacity. A substantial dispute having been
raised it was for the jury to determine whether or not the testator had testamentary
capacity as pointed out in Geist's Estate." 5 Another interesting conclusion was
the court's opinion there was nothing in this case to warrant the application of the
stringent rule of Hardin v. Hays"6 that the evidence of proponents must be a
"most exceptional kind and character." It would appear, however, that the hospital doctor's testimony did measure up to this requirement and in accordance
with the circumstances of the case as laid down in Hoopes' Estate. 67
In Mohler's Estate68 there was an appeal from the-decree of the Court below
refusing to grant an issue and dismissing the appeal from probate. Testatrix left
no children and appellant was a nephew who had been named as beneficiary under
a former will. The residuary legatee in the challenged will was the officer of a
trust company where the decedent had transacted business after the company
had been made guardian for her as a weak-minded person. She was under care
at a hospital for mental illness from January 7, 1939 to March 27, 1939. On
the latter date she was discharged but reported "for check-ups and advice" to
the hospital doctor, the last visit to his office being October 31, 1939. The will
was dated August 7, 1939 and testatrix died November 28, 1939. The petition
for citation alleged lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence practiced
by the chief beneficiary. The facts were that testatrix wrote the will herself at the
trust company's office on the day of its execution and in the absence of the chief
beneficiary from the office and city. There was no evidence whatsoever of undue
influence. On the issue of testamentary capacity, the subscribing witnesses were
well acquainted with the testatrix and declared that she was at the time competent
mentally and that she "knt* exactly what she wanted him (the witness) to do,"
when she requested the will to be subscribed and that she had a knowledge of
her property. Maxey, J., rejected the point that it was contrary to public policy
for a fiduciary and confidential advisor to be chief beneficiary of the confider's
estate, explaining that the law wisely casts upon such a legatee the burden of
proving that he used no undue influence to secure the legacy and this rule
65325 Pa. 401 (1937) 191A. 29.
66
See
67

note 48, supra.

See note 51, supra.
68343 Pa. 229 (1941)

22 A. 2d. 680.
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satisfies
testified
capacity
missing

all the applicable rzequirements of "public policy." The hospital doctor
for contestants but based his opinion of testatrix's lack of testamentary
on the fact that she harbored unjust prejudices against others. In disthis testimony as entitled to no weight the learned justice observed:
"The persuasive power of a conclusion is proportionate to the
cogency of the reasoning by which it is supported. An individual's
'unjust prejudices' against others has no relation to his testamentary
capacity and an opinion based 'principally' upon the converse assumption is entitled to little weight.'
Attention was likewise cilled to the pronounced attitude of the courts in
protecting the right of testamentary dispositions as declared so forcibly in Wetzel
v. Edwards9 and Kustus v. Hager.7 0
DERANGEMENT

71

In Taylor v. Trich, ' writing a number of years ago, Williams, J., observed:
"There is no subject that has given rise to more extended discussion in legal and medical circles than insanity. The tests by which its
existence and -xtent are to be determined; the stage of development at
which moral accountability ceases; the circumstances under which civil
accountability ought also to cease, and contracts to lose their legal
value because of the want of mental capacity on the part of him who
enters into them to form an intelligent judgment or give an intelligent
assent, have been and still are the subjects ot earnest debate.. The whole
subject is, however, better understood than formerly, notwithstanding
the want of entire harmony in the conclusions that have been reached."
These observations, in a noted will case involving the intricate question
whether a testator was laboring under delusions, are just as apt today, although
there have been great advances in the manner of what is now called mental illness.
According to a noted psychiatrist, writing for popular reading,72 mental distortions are, inter alia, perceptual, consisting of illusions, hallucinations and disorientation. Or they may be intellectual, consisting of obsessions, memory distortions, dissociations and delusions.
In Taylor v. Trich, supra, Williams, J., citing Tawney vs. Long7S for the
principle that partial insanity is enough to defeat a .will, which is the result of
such mental condition, further explained:
"By partial insanity is meant, not some intermediate stage in the
development of mental derangement, but disturbances at some particular point not involving tht mind at any other point. A person thus
affected is said to be under the influence of a delusion."
69340 Pa. 121 (1941) 16 A. 2d. 441.
70269 Pa. 103 (1920) 112 A. 45.

'71See note 38, supra.
"-The Human Mind by Karl A:- Menninger (1930).
7876 Pa. 106 (1874).
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A delusion rather loosely defined is a false impression or belief usually of
a fixed nature.
In the leading English case of Dew v. Clark,74 Sir John Nicoll declared:
'"Whenever the patient once conceives something extravagant to
exist which still has no existence whatever but in his own heated
imagination; and wherever, at the same time, having once so conceived,
he is incapable of being, or at least of being permanently, reasoned
out of that conception, such patient is said to be under a delusion in
a peculiar, half technical sense of the term; and the absence or presence
of delusion, so understood, forms, in my judgment, the true and only
test of absent or present insanity. In short, I look upon delusion in
this sense of it, and insanity, to be almost, if not altogether, convertible
terms; so that a patient, under a delusion, so understood, on any subject
or subjects in any degree, is for that reason essentially mad or insane
on such subject or subjects in that degree."
Rood in his work on Wills75 makes the statement that deranged action of the
mind is discovered "by observing the likes and dislikes, conduct, and beliefs of the
person" and further deduces that "the greater the degree of 'extravagance observed
in the likes and dislikes, conduct, and beliefs of the person, the stronger is their
tendency to produce a conviction that the person is not in his right mind; till
finally an extreme may be reached, as to any one of these or as to all three combined,
which we cannot account for on any other hypothesis than that the person was
not. in possession of his senses."
In our cases the word delusion is used to express the mental states which
psychiatrists classify as delusions, hallucinations and illusions, the latter being
perceptual, the second being intellectual, and the first partaking of both. In
Tawney v. Long78 testator evidentally suffering from senile dementia was under
the delusion that his wife at the time eighty years of age was immoral and guilty
of meretricious relationship with their son-in-law, a false and fantastic belief,
which the lower court pronounced as "monstrous." In Hoopes' Estate, 77 a case
of general insanity, the testator was afflicted with several delusions, inter alia,
that his farm was underlaid with rich coal deposits--an instance of delusion of
grandeur-another that his guardian would get his estate unless he made a willa sort of persecutional delusion. In Taylor v. Trick 78 the delusion was religious
and apparently of what has been called "the Jehovah complex." Anothtr noted
case is Thomas v. Carter79 where testator entertained against his own flesh and
blood a monomaniacal delusion, conceiving his daughter to be immoral and
always a bad character and his son-in-law as a knave. In affirming the judgment
743 Addams Ecc. 79, 90.

76Rood on
78
See note
77See
note
78
Sce note

Wills, 2nd. Ed. (1926)
73, supra.
51, supra.
38, supra.
79170 Pa. 272 (1895) 33 A. 81.

84.

DICKINSON LA WREVIEW

of the lower court setting aside the will which disinherited the daughter, the
following instruction to the jury was approved:
"If a monomaniacal delusion is unalterably entertained against
a wife or daughter, who otherwise would have been his legatee or
devisee, and who would seem to be the natural obj-ct of a man's
regard when he came to make a final disposition of his estate, and such
delusion is shown to have been the operating motive which excluded
them; and if the supposed act or misconduct, on the part of the wife
or child, or both, hag no existence in fact, and was a creature of the
diseased imagination of the testator, and the will was engendered by
this delusion and Was its offspring, and made under its influence
operating at the time and in the testamentary act; if, in short, the will
was dictated by the delusion it cannot be sustained as a last will and
testament, because it is the production of a mind incapable of correct
reasoning as to the object of his bounty and the character of his wife
and children, and their relations toward himself."
As a guide in the matter of proper instruction to a jury in such a case, the
above quotation should prove valuable to those handling cases of a similar nature,
as it appears that the learned judge has covered very accurately the various essential points. In the four preceding cases 8O just discussed, it will be observed
that testamentary power was denied either on the ground of general insanity,
that is where delusions were so varied as to becloud the mind of the testator
completely, or that the testator was at the time afflicted with such a delusion as
directly affected and was connected with his exercises of testamentary disposition. It should be reasonably obvious however that whatever serious delusion
happened to beset the mind of a testator, if such dtlusion had no connection
with the matter of testamentary disposition, however serious it might otherwise
be, nevertheless the testamentary power would remain in force. A few cases will
illustrate this point. In Herr's Estate8 ' the question was' whether the lower
court erred in refusing an issue and dismissing the appeal from the decree of the
register. The testatrix was 83 years of age at the time of her death, leaving a
will made nine years prior, in which, after giving specific legacies to certain
missionary and church extension societies connected with the United Brethren
in Christ, testatrix gave her residuary estate amounting to about $130,000.00
to the Union Biblical Seminary of the United Brethren in Christ, Dayton, Ohio.
The will was contested by a half-sister who was the nearest relative of the
decedent. In the opinion by Frazer, J., the evidence of testamentary capacity is
reviewed at considerable length involving the testimony of disinterested and
substantial witnesses who were present at the time of the execution of the will
which took place in the office of counsel for the testatrix. On the other hand,
the evidence of lack of testamentary capacity consisted of testimony concerning
"spells" to which the testatrix was subject and also the fact that she was miserly
8OTawney v. Long; Hoope's Estate; Taylor v. Trich; Thomas v. Carter.
81251 Pa. 223 (1915) 96 A. 464.
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and did not provide for herself sufficient food. It was further contended that
the will was induced by hallucinations or delusions under which testatrix had
been laboring for years, to the effect that her friends and relatives, with particular
reference to the contestant, were endeavoring to rob her of her property. However, evidence was also adduced to show that there was some justification for
the fears entertained by the testatrix on account of litigation that had been conducted by. the contestant. On these points the learned justice in affirming the
decree of the court below observed:
"A delusion which will render invalid a will executed as the direct
result of it, is an insane belief or a mere figment of imagination, a
belief in the existence of something which does not exist, and which
no rational person would believe did exist: Taylor v. Trich, 165 Pa.
586; Alexander's Est., 246 Pa. 58. The moment it is discovered, however, that what at first sight was apparently a delusion is in fact based
upon. some substantial ground, reasonably calculated to produce the
belief held by estatrix, the theory of the insane delusion necessarily
disappears. One who is of sound and disposing mind is entitled to
distribute his property as he may see fit, without regard to the personal
motives or prejudices which influenced him: Dean v. Negley, 41 Pa.
312; Phillips' Est., 244 Pa. 35. His prejudices, likes or dislikes are his
own as much as the property which he distributes, and the fact that his
method of distribution may offend our sense of propriety and justice
is no reason to set aside the will: Cauffman v. Long, 82 Pa. 72; Phillips'
Est., 244 Pa. 35-47."
Doster's Estate8 2 presents another illustrative case, somewhat dramatic in
background and details. There was an appeal from the register of wills, the contestant claiming that decedent at the time he made his will was under the insane
delusion that she was not his daughter. The court dismissed the appeal and
refused an issue. Whereupon the contestant appealed to the Supreme Court.
The testator, General William E. Doster, was a man of high intellectual attainment, a prominent lawyer for more than fifty years and a veteran of the Civil War,
serving his country with distinction. He died at the age of 82, and up to his
last day had a large, varied and lucrative practice which required his constant
care and personal supervision. He is described as a man of strong mind and remarkable physical vigor, personally supervising the management of his ten farms,
a banking institution, and looking after a large law practice. He was known
to have an arbitrary manner, a short curt military way"of speaking and given at
times to anger and bitter recollections.
The contestant had been educated by the father who sent her to Europe
at the age of 12 years, and he had seen very little of her and had left her education in the charge of strangers. The immediate facts involving the alleged delusion
consisted of a most unfortunate visit of the daughter and her family to the father
82271 Pa. 68 (1921)

113 A. 831.
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on July 17, 1918, uninvited, unannounced, as he was entertaining a guest in his
home. The conduct of the daughter was such as to outrage the father and on
July 25, 1918, at the age of 80 years, he wrote his will which became the present
subject of contest. After the incident of July 17, 1918, General Doster referred
to the contestant as not being his daughter. The lower court construed this allusion not in the literal sense as contestant did, but in rather a broad way as explaining ti* father's attitude toward the daughter following the unfortunate
incident already described. All the evidence indicated that General Doster at the
time he wrote his will was in possession of all his faculties and although he may
have been unjust and unforgiving in his attitude toward his daughter, after July
17, 1918, nevertheless, as remarked by Kephart, J., in affirming the decree of the
lower court:
"If his treatment of his daughter is to be considered cruel the
person who must answer for it is the General. For, out of his large
circle of acquaintances in that community, not one of his business or
professional associates was called to testify to want of testamentary
capacity."
In Guaranty Trust & Safe Deposit Co., Guardian, vs. Heidenreih s8 there is
a further illustration of theattitude of our courts in denying the efficiency of any
delusions entertained by the testator but which are obviously foreign to the matter of the will making. In this case the action of the lower court was set aside
in the granting of an issue and the judgment on the verdict was reversed and the
record remitted in order that the will might be duly probated. The testator was a
farmer 83 years of age at the time he executed his will under the supervision
of an attorney of good standing and after several conferences and considerable
discussion. The signature appeared in a clear strong hand and was witnessed by
two neighbors of the testator. There were other witnesses consisting of lawyers,
bankers, merchants, mechanics, collectors and others who had done business with
the testator and who gave evidence concerning his testamentary capacity at the
time. The son filed a caveat and the proceedings were certified by the register
to the orphans' court where later testimony was taken and an issue awarded resulting in a verdict and judgment for the contestant. The evidence for the contestants was to the effect that the testator was "'crazy," that he was afflicted with
senile dementia, a progressive malady, and, while he might do 'some business,
was incapable of making a valid will, that he suffered from delusions concerning religion and marriage. The appellate court inferred that the testimony might
tend to show that testator was a victim of erotomania, but that there was no
-evidence connecting the delusions with the testamentary dispositions. It is also
pointed out that several months before the execution of the will in question
the testator had executed another will drawn by the lawyer who later represented
83290 Pa. 249 (1927) 138 A. 764.
84206 Pa. 47 (1903) 55 A. 797.
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th* contestant in the present proceedings, this former will having been attested
by the particular attorney and his wife, and that at the trial in the case now under
consideration neither of these parties was asked concerning the testator's mental
condition.
As to the irrelevancy of. the evidence on delusions, Walling, J., declared:
"Considering and reconciling the evidence as best we may, it
clearly appears that testator's mind was sound as to matters of business, while a finding that he had delusions as to religion and matrimony
would be warranted. Delusions, however, will not affect the validity
of a will unless it is influenced thereby. 'A person whose mind is
erverted by insane delusions with references to one or many subjects,
owever unreasonable and absurd, may nevertheless make a valid will
provided the provisions of such will are not influenced by such delusions':Shreineret al. vs. Shreiner, 178 Pa. '67; see also Doster's Est.,
271 Pa. 68; Englert v. Englert, 198 Pa. 326; Thomas, Exr. vs. Carter,
et al., 170 Pa. 272; Taylor, Exr. vs. Trich, et al., 165' Pa. 586; and
Watmough's Est., 258 Pa. 22, 28. There is no evidence that testator
was under any delusion as to his property, or kindred. Neither the
clergymen, the church, nor the one he desired to marry, is mentioned
in the will; his entire estate being given to his children and grandchildren, all of whom were named therein. Hence, as the delusions
were entirely aside therefrom they are unimportant."
In Alexander's Estate 4 a daughter appealed from the decree of the Register
admitting the will of her father to probate and in a petition to the orphans' court
praying for an issue averred that the will, so far as it affected her, was the r'suit of a delusion upon the part of the testator which rendered him insensible
to his parental obligations and to have caused him to execute the will admitted
to probate. The court refused to award the issue and on appeal its *decree was
affirmed. The father's attitude towards his daughter was explained by her "unnatural conduct" in criticising the father's mode of life and also casting aspersions upon the memory of her dead mother. The evidence disclosed that
there were many stories of her criticisms which were carried to the father and
that they had caused him much distress of mind. In affirming the decree the following from the lower court's opinion was approved, showing sufficient justification for the father's will:
"Whether Mr. Alexander is to be condemned for listening to
rumors and idle gossip or, perhaps, to false stories told by persons
to discredit his own child, is not a question that this court is called
upon to decide. The only inquiry is whether there is evidence from
which a jury might reasonably infer that Mr. Alexander was laboring
under a mental disorder; and the result of that inquiry is that there is
nothing to show that he did more than take the stories as they came to
him, including the story about his dead wife, believe them and pass
a very severe judgment upon the daughter."
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In Watmough's Estate8 5 there was an appeal from the decree of the register
admitting a will to probate and a dismissal of the appeal by the orphans' court,
which refused to award an issue prayed for alleging testamentary incapacity,
where the only evidence relied upon to establish the issue was that of a physician
who had attended the testator for a period of eight years prior to' his death and
who testified that he observed no mental decline until on an occasion two and
one-half months before' the execution of the will, when the deceased was in his
77th year, he declared to the doctor that he was annoyed by red devils with
forked tails who had danced upon him during the night. The witness further
stated that there were days in the month preceding the execution of the will
when the deceased was entirely free from delusions and clear in mind and when
he knew his relatives and had an intelligent understanding of the value of his
estate. For the proponents of the will two reputable attorneys, witnesses to the
execution of the will, testified that the testator was at the time of the execution
in full possession of his faculties and had himself dictated the will and was fully
informed with respect to all that it contained.
In a recent case 86 the Supreme Court has pointed out the circumstances undL-r
which an unfounded belief degenerated into an insane delusion affecting fatally
the will of an aged uncle who disinherited a nephew. For nearly forty years
the relationship between the two had been as father and son when immediately
following the funeral of testator's wife, for no sensible reason, his feeling toward
his nephew suddenly underwent a violent change. This change appeared to have
been based on the false belief of the uncle that his nephew planned sending him
to an institution. Said Drew, J.:
d the court below that the uncle's
"We agree with the ju
sudden and bitter accusation of his nephew (whom he had for so many
years cherished with love and affection), charging that he plotted to
control of his
have him confined in an institution in order to obtain
8
estate, could be the result of only an insane delusion." "
ANTIPATHIES

Under any topic in the matter of testamentary dispositions are grouped a
number of human emotions and mental states which have a powerful directive
influence upon the individual guiding or driving him in the determination of
the disposition of his property. Keeping in mind the theory of testamentary
power as an exaltation of the individual's freedom of action-that he may do
with his own as he pleases, barring the"restrictions already discussed, the advance
is made to the presumption of testamentary capacity-that every will maker is
presumed to have a consciousness and full realization of the import of the testa85258 Pa. 22 (1917)

101 A. 857.

86Leedom's Estate, 347 Pa. 180 (1943) 32 A. 2d. 3.
87Compa.re Leedom Case with McGovran's Estate, 185 Pa. 203 (1897)
Estate (note 81 ante).

39 A. 816, and Herr's

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

mentary act and the burden is upon him who controverts this status, the conclusion is inevitable that the motive for action is irrelevant. Sympathy or antipathy,
likes or dislikes, love or hatred, as the motive directing the gift are each and all
wholly immaterial in the view of the law. Long ago, Paxson, J., in Cauffman
v. Long,8 8 quoted with approval the glib dictum of another, "A man's prejudices are a part of his liberty," a saying since quoted many times over. As recent
as Mohler's Estate 9 Maxey, J., observed:
"As to Mrs. Mohler's prejudices the court below appropriately
said: 'She was indignant over the appointment of the guardian ...
However, she was entitled to her likes and dislikes, her preferences
and prejudices, and even when overdrawn or in error this attitude does
not justify the conclusion she was unable intelligently and capably to
make her will!"
In Mark's Estate90 likewise it was declared that antipathies against relatives, standing alone are no evidence of a disordered mind nor do they imply an
impaired mentality. In McGovran's Estate 1 the evidence showed marked hostility
upon the part of the testatrix towards a niece attributing every attention received
from that source to mercenary motives and believing not only that she was scheming
to get a portion of testatrix's 'estate but expressing fear the niece might take her
life the sooner to enjoy it. This case probably marks the verge of the law, the
court pointing out that if the evidence of such a condition of mind and feeling
upon the part of testatrix had been followed by other evidence showing the same
as based upon the supposed existence of facts which never existed and which no
rational person, in the absence of evidence, would have believed to exist, this
92
situation would be consistent with a theory of delusion. In Thomas v. Carter
an illustration is presented of antipathies and unfounded beliefs and prejudices
transcending from the innocuous to monomaniacal delusions affecting fatally
testamentary capacity. Thus in Matter of Mintzer 9 s it was declared:
"If a testator entertains against his own flesh and blood some
monomaniacal delusion, and because of the existence of this delusion,
and while laboring under its affects, he disinherits them, the act is
evidently one for which he would not be morally or legally responsible,
it is the act of a man laboring under a specific species of insanity, and
the testator is not and cannot be deemed to be a rational being-he is
not a free agent."
8

8 See note 55, supra.

89See note 68, supra.

90298 Pa, 285 (1929)
91185 Pa. 203 (1898)
2

9 See note 79, supra.

085 Phila. 206 (1863).

148 A. 297.
39 A. 816.
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BELIEFS AND OPINIONS

Every individual is entitled to hold his own particular and peculiar beliefs
and opinions and the rule of law is that such beliefs and opinions, sound or erroneous, do not necessarily 94 militate against testamentary capacity. Judge King
in Leech v. Leech 95 referring to witchcraft and other strange beliefs, observed:
"Eccentricities of conduct, absurd opinions, or belief, in things
appearing to us extravagant, although they may be and are evidences
of testamentary incapacity, do not constitute it necessarily and in themselves."
If, however, such beliefs or opinions, religious or otherwise, unsound or
extravagant, become delusions, affecting directly the testamentary disposition, the
question of incapacity of the testator is presented.96 Conversely, it has been held
that a mere belief in spiritualism is not, of itself, evidence of insanity and sufficient to show te absence of testamentary capacity. But if a person has become
a monomaniac on the subject, incapable of reason where it is concerned, then a
will made in consequence of such monomania is void for lack of testamentary
capacity.97
SUMMARY

From a study of the aforegoing cases the following propositions of law are
established:
Every person of sound mind and of the age of twenty-one years or
(1)
upwards, whether married or single, is competent to make a will disposing of his
or her property. 98
(2) In the cases of nuncupation generally the required age of the testator is
twenty-one years or upwards, but it has been held that this age requirement does
not apply to "any mariner being at sea or any soldier in actual military service,"
in which cases the age required is over fourteen years in accordance with common
99
law.
(3) The test of sound disposing mind is formulated in many cases notably
in Leech v. Leech 100 by Judge King and followed consistently by later decisions.
4

9 Lawrence's Est., 286 Pa. 58 (1926)

132 A. 786, per Kephart, J. Also,

Excentricities and

Testamentary Capacity by James.
911 Phila. 244 affirmed in 21 Pa. 67 (1853). Zaydon, 46 D. L. R. 254.
O6But delusions will not destroy testamentary capacity unless they dictate the will: Power v.
Overholt, 257 Pa. 254 (1917) 101 A. 733; Shreiner v. Shreiner, 178 Pa. 57 (1896) 35 A. 974;
Guarantee
T. & S. Dept. Co. v. Heidenrich, 290 Pa. 249 (1927) 138 A. 764; 68 C. J. 432, sec. 29.
97
Matter of Mintzer, 5 Phila. 206 (1863); Ann. Cas. 1916 C. 4.
9820 PS 181.
9930 D.R. 413 (1921); see also Satar's Est., 275 Pa. 420 (1923) 119 A. 478; Smith's Will,
6 Phila. 104 (1865) ; Linsenbigler's vs. Gourley, 56 Pa. 166 (1867); McNelis' E t., 22 D.&C. 486
(1935) ; Gromczuski's Est., 19 Erie 478, 51 York 186 (1938).
10OSee note 6, supra.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

(4) The courts have recognized in a long line of decisions "the unquestioned right which every one master of himself has to give his property to whom
he pleases," per Maxey, J., citing Kustus v. Hager'01 as quoted in Mohler's
102
Estate.
(5) No right of a citizen is more valued than the power to dispose of his
property by will and his last and final direction should not be struck down except
for the cleaest reason.' 02
(6) Where a paper in testamentary form is proved to be properly executed
there arise two presumptions (a) that the will maker was of testamentary capacity
and that the testamentary act was free from undue influence. 104 And (b) that
the will maker was at the time of the execution of the will "of the age of twentyone years or upwards."'' 05
(7)
To upset such a will the contestants must adduce compelling evidence,
since the law favors its validity, pLr Drew, J.106
(8)
If the will is probated and no appeal is taken for two years, from the
107
decree of the Register, the presumption as to full age becomes conclusive.
(9) An adjudication of the insanity of the will maker either shortly before
the execution of the will or shortly afterward, or any other evidence of insanity at or
about the time of execution of the will, offered by contestants will dislodge the
presumption of capacity and impose upon the proponents the burden of establishing the same by a preponderance of evidence. 108
(10)
A will maker shown by the weight of evidence to have been generally
insane at the time of execution lacks testamentary capacity and the will is
invalid.109
(11)
A will maker shown by the weight of evidence to be partially insane
may nevertheless have testamentary capacity if the weight of evidence shows a
lucid interval at the time of execution sufficient to measure up to the prescribed
0
test."1
(12)
Old age, sickness, distress, debility of body, peculiar beliefs and
opinions, incapacity to do business, partial failure of memory neither prove nor
raise a presumption of incapacity."'
101269 Pa. 103 (1920) 112 A. 45.
02
1 See note 89, supra.
3
1o Wetzel v. Edwards, 341 Pa. 121

(1940) 16 A. 2d. 441.

l04Olshefski's Est., 347 Pa. 420 (1940)

11 A. 2d. 487.

10$Stout v. Young, 217 Pa. 427 (1907) 66 A. 659.
10

6See note 104, supra.

107See not 105, supra.
notes 48-53, supra.
10SSee
109See notes 40 and 51, supra.
11

oSee note 59, supra.
111Per Kephart, J., Lawrence's 'Est., supra. See note 19, supra.
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(13)
A delusion amounting to monomania and shown to be the immediatecause of the testamentary disposition may render the will invalid although
1 2
thL testator has general testamentary capacity. 1
(14)
Antipathies, dislikes and hatreds reflected in testamentary dispositions are of themselves insufficient to render a will invalid unless they transcend
to delusions as heretofore stated."1
(15)
A potent and frequently controlling factor in will contests is the
exercise of the judicial function as developed in the evolution of the issue
devisavit vel non. This interesting feature of the law of wills will be discussed
in a later article, but a reading of the cases already cited will be helpful at this
point."'
A.
February 22, 1945.
112See note 92, supra,

11See
note 91, supra.
I1 4See note 14, supra.
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